communications

                     

LOCAL UK – FOIAS

1. Leasehold Service Charge Regulation Delays

COCOO’s correspondence (e.g., “LBC PAD to DLUHC lease 16 may 25.txt”, “TO DLUHC – leashold service charge 7jul25.txt”) alleges DLUHC’s failure to implement a mandatory Code of Practice and redress scheme for leasehold service charges, causing significant consumer harm (e.g., £2 billion in overcharges). Requests focus on internal decision-making and evidence of harm.

**Requests:**
1. All internal DLUHC correspondence, memos, or briefings from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 discussing reasons for delays in implementing a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents, as recommended in the Lord Best report (2019).
2. Minutes and responses from DLUHC consultations with stakeholders (e.g., Leasehold Knowledge Partnership, Competition and Markets Authority) on leasehold service charge transparency or redress schemes from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025.
3. DLUHC impact assessments or analyses from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 quantifying consumer harm (e.g., financial distress, excessive charges) due to unregulated leasehold service charges.
4. Correspondence between DLUHC and the Competition and Markets Authority from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 regarding anti-competitive practices in property management, including references to the 2018 Berkshire estate agent fines or the April 2025 CMA report on FirstPort.
5. Internal DLUHC documents from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 explaining why the mandatory Code of Practice and redress scheme have not been enacted, including any legal advice or ministerial submissions.

**Questions:**
1. What specific barriers have delayed the implementation of a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents since 2020?
2. How has DLUHC responded to the Housing Ombudsman’s May 2025 report noting a 30% rise in leasehold service charge complaints?
3. What actions has DLUHC taken since April 2025 to address the CMA’s findings on potential anti-competitive practices by FirstPort?

#### 2. Postponement of Local Elections (SI 2025/137)
Documents (e.g., “to DLUHC POSTPONED ELECTIONS 16may25.txt”, “MHCLG REPLY – FOI202514778- 12JUN25.pdf”) highlight DLUHC’s failure to consult on postponing 2025 local elections in nine council areas, raising procedural fairness concerns. Requests seek transparency on the decision-making process.

**Requests:**
6. All DLUHC correspondence, minutes, or reports from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing the decision to postpone May 2025 local elections in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Thurrock, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, East Sussex, West Sussex, and Surrey.
7. Internal DLUHC documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying the lack of specific public or elected representative consultations on the election postponement, distinct from broader local government reorganisation consultations.
8. Internal DLUHC communications or submissions to Ministers from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing potential impacts of newly elected councils on public-private partnerships, major development agreements, or infrastructure projects in the affected council areas.
9. DLUHC risk assessments or briefings from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic impact of postponing the 2025 local elections.
10. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining DLUHC’s plans to implement or fund “Transition Citizen Juries” or other mitigation measures to address the democratic deficit caused by the postponement.

**Questions:**
4. What evidence did DLUHC rely on to conclude that administrative convenience outweighed the democratic impact of postponing the 2025 local elections?
5. Why were no alternatives to outright postponement, such as shadow authorities or phased reorganisation, formally documented or considered?
6. How does DLUHC plan to monitor and address public trust in the affected council areas until elections in 2026?

#### 3. Crown Development Routes
COCOO’s concerns (e.g., “TO MCGHLG – DEVELOPMENT 7jul25.txt”, “mhclg expedited crown 250427.txt”) focus on vague criteria and inadequate scrutiny in the Crown and Urgent Crown Development routes. Requests aim to clarify criteria and consultation processes.

**Requests:**
11. All DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 defining or discussing the criteria for “national importance” and “urgency” under the Crown Development and Urgent Crown Development routes (Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, sections 293B–293J).
12. Correspondence or minutes from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 between DLUHC and local planning authorities regarding consultation processes for Crown Development applications.
13. DLUHC assessments or reports from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic or procedural impacts of bypassing local planning processes under the Crown Development routes.
14. Copies of all statements submitted by applicants under Article 4(1)(c)(iii) of the Crown Development Order or Article 6(1)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Urgent Crown Order from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying “national importance” or “urgency.”
15. DLUHC correspondence or submissions to Parliament from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 regarding the annual report on decisions taken under the Crown Development routes, as referenced in the 13 February 2025 Written Ministerial Statement.

**Questions:**
7. What objective criteria does DLUHC apply to assess “national importance” and “urgency” for Crown Development applications?
8. How does DLUHC ensure local planning authority representations are given substantial weight in Urgent Crown Development decisions?
9. What steps has DLUHC taken since February 2025 to establish a cross-party parliamentary committee to scrutinize Crown Development applications?

#### 4. Floating Bus Stops
The TfL correspondence (“TfL_250427.txt”) raises safety and accessibility issues with floating bus stops, alleging breaches of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED). Requests target TfL’s decision-making and risk assessments.

**Requests:**
16. All TfL documents from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 demonstrating how “due regard” was paid to the PSED under the Equality Act 2010, particularly for visually impaired and mobility-impaired individuals, before approving or funding floating bus stop designs.
17. TfL risk assessments or comparative analyses from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 evaluating alternative bus stop designs that avoid pedestrian-cycle lane conflicts, including the rationale for rejecting such alternatives.
18. Minutes or correspondence from TfL consultations with Disabled Persons’ Organisations from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 regarding the safety and accessibility of floating bus stops.
19. TfL casualty data or incident reports from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 related to floating bus stops, including any assessments of impacts on disabled users.
20. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining TfL’s plans to review or remediate floating bus stops in response to safety or accessibility concerns.

**Questions:**
10. How did TfL weigh the input of Disabled Persons’ Organisations against other stakeholders in approving floating bus stop designs?
11. What is TfL’s current justification for continuing to use floating bus stops given reported safety and accessibility issues?
12. Will TfL commit to a time-bound taskforce with Disabled Persons’ Organisations to develop a National Accessibility & Safety Standard for bus stops?

#### 5. Birmingham Waste Collection Crisis
The Birmingham City Council letter (“waste collection BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL 250427.txt”) highlights public health risks from the 2025 waste collection crisis, linked to financial distress. Requests seek transparency on governance and mitigation.

**Requests:**
21. All Birmingham City Council correspondence, reports, or minutes from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing the link between the £1 billion equal pay liability and the March/April 2025 waste collection crisis.
22. Internal council documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining steps to prevent future waste collection failures due to financial mismanagement.
23. Risk assessments or public health reports from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the health risks (e.g., Weil’s disease, pest infestations) during the waste collection crisis.
24. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 detailing the council’s plans for independent oversight mechanisms, such as a Public Interest Monitor, to ensure waste service delivery standards.
25. Correspondence or agreements from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 between the council, resident associations, trade unions, or public health bodies regarding waste collection service recovery.

**Questions:**
13. What specific measures has Birmingham City Council implemented since April 2025 to address the financial governance issues that contributed to the waste crisis?
14. How does the council justify its current waste management strategies as sufficient to prevent recurrence of public health risks?
15. Why has the council not adopted an independent oversight mechanism, like a Public Interest Monitor, for waste services?

#### 6. Croydon Area Remodelling Scheme (CARS)
The HM Treasury letter (“Chancellor of the Exchequer_250427.txt”) criticizes the pause of CARS, alleging irrationality. Requests focus on updated assessments and decision-making.

**Requests:**
26. All HM Treasury or DfT correspondence, reports, or briefings from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 discussing the decision to continue pausing the Croydon Area Remodelling Scheme (CARS) post-2021 Spending Review.
27. Updated economic, housing, or passenger demand forecasts from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 used to reassess the CARS business case.
28. Internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 evaluating alternative funding models (e.g., phased investment) for CARS and reasons for their rejection.
29. Risk assessments or analyses from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 on the fiscal and economic impacts of not proceeding with CARS, including effects on Gatwick Airport growth.
30. Correspondence between HM Treasury, DfT, or the National Infrastructure Commission from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 regarding a potential independent review of CARS.

**Questions:**
16. What updated data since 2021 supports the continued pause of CARS, given its role in housing and economic growth?
17. Why has HM Treasury not commissioned an independent review of CARS by the National Infrastructure Commission?
18. How does HM Treasury justify the pause as rational in light of current passenger demand and Gatwick expansion plans?

#### 7. Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025
Documents (e.g., “to DLUHC foi team 5jun25.txt”, “DLUHC (formerly mhclh)foia reply.27may25.pdf”) question DLUHC’s lack of recorded engagement with the Order’s planning implications. Requests target internal assessments and inter-departmental coordination.

**Requests:**
31. All DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 assessing the impact of the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025 on local decision-making, NPPF alignment, or local planning authority resources.
32. Correspondence or minutes from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 between DLUHC and DESNZ regarding the Order’s planning implications, including any concerns raised by DLUHC.
33. DLUHC documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 outlining guidance or support materials prepared for local planning authorities assessing solar farms (50-100MW) under the Order.
34. Internal DLUHC records from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 detailing the search methodologies, directorates, or officials consulted in response to EIR2025/12371.
35. DLUHC policies or protocols from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 on inter-departmental consultation for statutory instruments impacting the national planning system.

**Questions:**
19. What specific steps did DLUHC take to assess the Order’s impact on local planning principles before its enactment?
20. Why does DLUHC claim no information is held on its involvement with the Order, given its planning remit?
21. How is DLUHC supporting local planning authorities to handle solar farm applications (50-100MW) under the Order?

### Redrafted Freedom of Information Request Letter

Oscar Moya LLedo
23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

To: Knowledge and Information Access Team
Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF
Email: foi@communities.gov.uk

CC:
Transport for London, tph.enquiries@tfl.gov.uk
Birmingham City Council, gbslep@birmingham.gov.uk
HM Treasury, public.enquiries@hmtreasury.gov.uk
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, foi.requests@energysecurity.gov.uk

Date: 18 July 2025

Subject: Freedom of Information Request

Dear Knowledge and Information Access Team,

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following recorded information held by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC), Transport for London (TfL), Birmingham City Council, HM Treasury, and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ). If this letter does not reach the intended recipient, please forward it to the relevant department internally, as required by principles of good administrative practice.

**Leasehold Service Charge Regulation (DLUHC)**
1. All internal DLUHC correspondence, memos, or briefings from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 discussing reasons for delays in implementing a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents, as recommended in the Lord Best report (2019).
2. Minutes and responses from DLUHC consultations with stakeholders (e.g., Leasehold Knowledge Partnership, Competition and Markets Authority) on leasehold service charge transparency or redress schemes from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025.
3. DLUHC impact assessments or analyses from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 quantifying consumer harm (e.g., financial distress, excessive charges) due to unregulated leasehold service charges.
4. Correspondence between DLUHC and the Competition and Markets Authority from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 regarding anti-competitive practices in property management, including references to the 2018 Berkshire estate agent fines or the April 2025 CMA report on FirstPort.
5. Internal DLUHC documents from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 explaining why the mandatory Code of Practice and redress scheme have not been enacted, including any legal advice or ministerial submissions.

**Postponement of Local Elections (DLUHC)**
6. All DLUHC correspondence, minutes, or reports from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing the decision to postpone May 2025 local elections in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Thurrock, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, East Sussex, West Sussex, and Surrey.
7. Internal DLUHC documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying the lack of specific public or elected representative consultations on the election postponement, distinct from broader local government reorganisation consultations.
8. Internal DLUHC communications or submissions to Ministers from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing potential impacts of newly elected councils on public-private partnerships, major development agreements, or infrastructure projects in the affected council areas.
9. DLUHC risk assessments or briefings from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic impact of postponing the 2025 local elections.
10. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining DLUHC’s plans to implement or fund “Transition Citizen Juries” or other mitigation measures to address the democratic deficit caused by the postponement.

**Crown Development Routes (DLUHC)**
11. All DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 defining or discussing the criteria for “national importance” and “urgency” under the Crown Development and Urgent Crown Development routes (Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, sections 293B–293J).
12. Correspondence or minutes from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 between DLUHC and local planning authorities regarding consultation processes for Crown Development applications.
13. DLUHC assessments or reports from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic or procedural impacts of bypassing local planning processes under the Crown Development routes.
14. Copies of all statements submitted by applicants under Article 4(1)(c)(iii) of the Crown Development Order or Article 6(1)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Urgent Crown Order from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying “national importance” or “urgency.”
15. DLUHC correspondence or submissions to Parliament from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 regarding the annual report on decisions taken under the Crown Development routes, as referenced in the 13 February 2025 Written Ministerial Statement.

**Floating Bus Stops (TfL)**
16. All TfL documents from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 demonstrating how “due regard” was paid to the PSED under the Equality Act 2010, particularly for visually impaired and mobility-impaired individuals, before approving or funding floating bus stop designs.
17. TfL risk assessments or comparative analyses from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 evaluating alternative bus stop designs that avoid pedestrian-cycle lane conflicts, including the rationale for rejecting such alternatives.
18. Minutes or correspondence from TfL consultations with Disabled Persons’ Organisations from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 regarding the safety and accessibility of floating bus stops.
19. TfL casualty data or incident reports from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 related to floating bus stops, including any assessments of impacts on disabled users.
20. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining TfL’s plans to review or remediate floating bus stops in response to safety or accessibility concerns.

**Birmingham Waste Collection Crisis (Birmingham City Council)**
21. All Birmingham City Council correspondence, reports, or minutes from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing the link between the £1 billion equal pay liability and the March/April 2025 waste collection crisis.
22. Internal council documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining steps to prevent future waste collection failures due to financial mismanagement.
23. Risk assessments or public health reports from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the health risks (e.g., Weil’s disease, pest infestations) during the waste collection crisis.
24. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 detailing the council’s plans for independent oversight mechanisms, such as a Public Interest Monitor, to ensure waste service delivery standards.
25. Correspondence or agreements from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 between the council, resident associations, trade unions, or public health bodies regarding waste collection service recovery.

**Croydon Area Remodelling Scheme (HM Treasury/DfT)**
26. All HM Treasury or DfT correspondence, reports, or briefings from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 discussing the decision to continue pausing the Croydon Area Remodelling Scheme (CARS) post-2021 Spending Review.
27. Updated economic, housing, or passenger demand forecasts from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 used to reassess the CARS business case.
28. Internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 evaluating alternative funding models (e.g., phased investment) for CARS and reasons for their rejection.
29. Risk assessments or analyses from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 on the fiscal and economic impacts of not proceeding with CARS, including effects on Gatwick Airport growth.
30. Correspondence between HM Treasury, DfT, or the National Infrastructure Commission from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 regarding a potential independent review of CARS.

**Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025 (DLUHC/DESNZ)**
31. All DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 assessing the impact of the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025 on local decision-making, NPPF alignment, or local planning authority resources.
32. Correspondence or minutes from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 between DLUHC and DESNZ regarding the Order’s planning implications, including any concerns raised by DLUHC.
33. DLUHC documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 outlining guidance or support materials prepared for local planning authorities assessing solar farms (50-100MW) under the Order.
34. Internal DLUHC records from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 detailing the search methodologies, directorates, or officials consulted in response to EIR2025/12371.
35. DLUHC policies or protocols from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 on inter-departmental consultation for statutory instruments impacting the national planning system.

Please provide the requested information in electronic format within 20 working days, as required by the FOI Act. If any exemptions apply, please specify the reasons and relevant sections of the Act. For clarification, contact me at contact@cocoo.uk.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo

Leasehold Service Charge Regulation Delays

The documents show COCOO’s concern about DLUHC’s failure to implement a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents and a redress scheme, causing financial harm to leaseholders. The FOI request should seek specific documents to clarify the reasons for delays and assess potential claims.

**Requests:**
1. All internal DLUHC correspondence, memos, or briefings from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 discussing reasons for delays in implementing a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents, as referenced in the Lord Best report (2019).
2. Minutes and responses from DLUHC consultations with stakeholders (e.g., Leasehold Knowledge Partnership, Competition and Markets Authority) on leasehold service charge transparency or redress schemes from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025.
3. Any DLUHC impact assessments or analyses from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 quantifying consumer harm (e.g., financial distress, excessive charges) due to unregulated leasehold service charges.
4. Correspondence between DLUHC and the Competition and Markets Authority from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 regarding anti-competitive practices in property management, including any references to the 2018 Berkshire estate agent fines or the April 2025 CMA report on FirstPort.
5. Internal DLUHC documents from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 explaining why the mandatory Code of Practice and redress scheme have not been enacted, including any legal advice or ministerial submissions.

**Questions:**
1. What specific barriers or considerations have delayed the implementation of a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents since 2020?
2. How has DLUHC responded to the Housing Ombudsman’s May 2025 report noting a 30% rise in leasehold service charge complaints?
3. What steps has DLUHC taken since April 2025 to address the CMA’s findings on potential anti-competitive practices by FirstPort?

#### Postponement of Local Elections (SI 2025/137)
The correspondence highlights DLUHC’s failure to consult on postponing 2025 local elections in nine council areas and the lack of transparency about alternatives. The FOI request should seek documents to understand the decision-making process and potential external influences.

**Requests:**
1. All DLUHC correspondence, minutes, or reports from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing the decision to postpone May 2025 local elections in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Thurrock, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, East Sussex, West Sussex, and Surrey.
2. Any DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying the lack of specific public or elected representative consultations on the election postponement, distinct from broader local government reorganisation consultations.
3. Internal DLUHC communications or submissions to Ministers from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing potential impacts of newly elected councils on public-private partnerships, major development agreements, or infrastructure projects in the affected council areas.
4. Any DLUHC risk assessments or briefings from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic impact of postponing the 2025 local elections.
5. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining DLUHC’s plans to implement or fund “Transition Citizen Juries” or other mitigation measures to address the democratic deficit caused by the postponement.

**Questions:**
1. What specific evidence did DLUHC rely on to conclude that administrative convenience outweighed the democratic impact of postponing the 2025 local elections?
2. Why were no alternatives to outright postponement, such as shadow authorities or phased reorganisation, formally documented or considered?
3. How does DLUHC plan to monitor and address public trust in the affected council areas until elections in 2026?

#### Crown Development Routes
COCOO’s concerns focus on the lack of transparent criteria for “national importance” and “urgency” and inadequate parliamentary scrutiny. The FOI request should seek documents to evaluate procedural fairness and accountability.

**Requests:**
1. All DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 defining or discussing the criteria for “national importance” and “urgency” under the Crown Development and Urgent Crown Development routes (Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, sections 293B–293J).
2. Correspondence or minutes from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 between DLUHC and local planning authorities regarding consultation processes for Crown Development applications.
3. Any DLUHC assessments or reports from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic or procedural impacts of bypassing local planning processes under the Crown Development routes.
4. Copies of all statements submitted by applicants under Article 4(1)(c)(iii) of the Crown Development Order or Article 6(1)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Urgent Crown Order from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying “national importance” or “urgency.”
5. DLUHC correspondence or submissions to Parliament from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 regarding the annual report on decisions taken under the Crown Development routes, as referenced in the 13 February 2025 Written Ministerial Statement.

**Questions:**
1. What objective criteria does DLUHC apply to assess “national importance” and “urgency” for Crown Development applications?
2. How does DLUHC ensure that local planning authority representations are given substantial weight in Urgent Crown Development decisions?
3. What steps has DLUHC taken since February 2025 to establish a cross-party parliamentary committee to scrutinize Crown Development applications?

### Draft Freedom of Information Request Letter

Oscar Moya LLedo
23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

To: Knowledge and Information Access Team
Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government
2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF
Email: foi@communities.gov.uk

Date: 18 July 2025

Subject: Freedom of Information Request

Dear Knowledge and Information Access Team,

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following recorded information held by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC). If this letter does not reach the intended recipient, please forward it to the relevant department internally, as required by principles of good administrative practice.

**Leasehold Service Charge Regulation**
1. All internal DLUHC correspondence, memos, or briefings from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 discussing reasons for delays in implementing a mandatory Code of Practice for property managing agents, as referenced in the Lord Best report (2019).
2. Minutes and responses from DLUHC consultations with stakeholders (e.g., Leasehold Knowledge Partnership, Competition and Markets Authority) on leasehold service charge transparency or redress schemes from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025.
3. Any DLUHC impact assessments or analyses from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 quantifying consumer harm (e.g., financial distress, excessive charges) due to unregulated leasehold service charges.
4. Correspondence between DLUHC and the Competition and Markets Authority from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 regarding anti-competitive practices in property management, including references to the 2018 Berkshire estate agent fines or the April 2025 CMA report on FirstPort.
5. Internal DLUHC documents from 1 January 2020 to 18 July 2025 explaining why the mandatory Code of Practice and redress scheme have not been enacted, including any legal advice or ministerial submissions.

**Postponement of Local Elections (SI 2025/137)**
6. All DLUHC correspondence, minutes, or reports from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing the decision to postpone May 2025 local elections in Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Thurrock, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, East Sussex, West Sussex, and Surrey.
7. Any DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying the lack of specific public or elected representative consultations on the election postponement, distinct from broader local government reorganisation consultations.
8. Internal DLUHC communications or submissions to Ministers from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 discussing potential impacts of newly elected councils on public-private partnerships, major development agreements, or infrastructure projects in the affected council areas.
9. Any DLUHC risk assessments or briefings from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic impact of postponing the 2025 local elections.
10. Documents from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 outlining DLUHC’s plans to implement or fund “Transition Citizen Juries” or other mitigation measures to address the democratic deficit caused by the postponement.

**Crown Development Routes**
11. All DLUHC internal documents from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 defining or discussing the criteria for “national importance” and “urgency” under the Crown Development and Urgent Crown Development routes (Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, sections 293B–293J).
12. Correspondence or minutes from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 between DLUHC and local planning authorities regarding consultation processes for Crown Development applications.
13. Any DLUHC assessments or reports from 1 January 2023 to 18 July 2025 evaluating the democratic or procedural impacts of bypassing local planning processes under the Crown Development routes.
14. Copies of all statements submitted by applicants under Article 4(1)(c)(iii) of the Crown Development Order or Article 6(1)(c)(iv)(aa) of the Urgent Crown Order from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 justifying “national importance” or “urgency.”
15. DLUHC correspondence or submissions to Parliament from 1 January 2024 to 18 July 2025 regarding the annual report on decisions taken under the Crown Development routes, as referenced in the 13 February 2025 Written Ministerial Statement.

Please provide the requested information in electronic format within 20 working days, as required by the FOI Act. If any exemptions apply, please specify the reasons and relevant sections of the Act. For clarification, contact me at contact@cocoo.uk.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo

 (DHLUC (former mhclg):  COMMUNICATIONS

SELF-QUESTIONS ON PROCUREMENT

Submission Channels and Initial Screening

Public bodies typically channel unsolicited proposals through their central procurement portals or designated email addresses, mirroring the way London Fire Brigade routes low-value contracts under £30,000 via its In-tend e-tendering portal and Contracts Finder postings (london-fire.gov.uk). In the U.S., the General Services Administration requires proposers to submit directly through the GSA website’s unsolicited‐proposal inbox, ensuring the proposal reaches the relevant office without filtration (gsa.gov). The most viable approach for COCOO is to identify and use each authority’s published DPS or e-sourcing entry point—such as a CCS Dynamic Purchasing System portal—and to confirm the procurement officer or team email responsible for unsolicited submissions, thus guaranteeing prompt logging and acknowledgement.

Acknowledgment Timelines

Under U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation 15.606-1, agencies must promptly acknowledge receipt of a compliant unsolicited proposal and assign it a tracking number, often within 10 business days (acquisition.gov). Although UK law does not specify a strict deadline, best practice—endorsed by DOE guidance—suggests acknowledgment within 30 days of receipt to align with fiscal planning cycles (ppp.worldbank.org). COCOO should therefore build into its follow-up cadence a check-in at the four-week mark, while confirming with each contracting authority whether they issue automatic tracking acknowledgments.

Content Requirements and Checklists

FAR 15.605 mandates that unsolicited proposals include the offeror’s name, contact details for technical and business personnel, a thorough description of the innovation, and an explanation of benefits to the agency (acquisition.gov). The World Bank’s USP policy similarly requires objectives, proprietary data identifications, and estimates of public-sector support needed (ppp.worldbank.org). The optimal strategy for COCOO is to structure its POPIA Framework submission using the FAR checklist as a template—clearly labeling confidential sections—while customizing it to reflect UK and EU public-value criteria (such as social value scoring) referenced in recent “social value” procurement reforms (ft.com).

Economic and Impact Analyses

Many agencies expect unsolicited proposals to be accompanied by robust cost-benefit models demonstrating value for money. The GSA encourages inclusion of financial projections and return-on-investment analyses (acquisition.gov), and UK procurement reforms emphasize quantifiable social and environmental impacts under the new Procurement Act (ft.com). COCOO’s most viable solution is to prepare a concise economic addendum—using its Non-Visible Wealth Impact Assessment toolkit—that models the financial, health and equality-impact savings of proposed remediation, thereby satisfying both technical and fiscal evaluators.

Evaluation Timeline and Milestones

U.S. agencies recommend submitting proposals at least six months before the intended project start to align with appropriations cycles (ppp.worldbank.org). While UK bodies have no mandated deadlines, CCS’s Pipeline and Find a Tender service indicate that evaluation windows typically span two to three months from proposal receipt (thetimes.co.uk). COCOO should map its internal project plan to these cycles—scheduling stakeholder briefings and follow-ups at four- and eight-week intervals—to ensure its proposal remains active through decision points and budget approvals.

Validity Period for Pricing

FAR 15.605 often requires proposal pricing remain valid for the remainder of the fiscal year (acquisition.gov), and UK tenderers are generally asked to hold prices for at least 120 days under CCS guidelines (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk). To avoid misalignment, COCOO’s USP will specify a 180-day validity for all fixed-price elements, with an option to extend by mutual agreement. This strikes a balance between fiscal certainty for the authority and practical safeguards for COCOO against inflationary risks.

Confidentiality and Proprietary Data

Best practice from U.S. agencies under FAR 15.609 mandates clear markings for proprietary information, limiting reproduction and controlling disclosure (acquisition.gov). In the UK, the Procurement Act’s transparency rules allow contracting authorities to redact “commercially sensitive” data when publishing contracts and require agencies to protect marked confidential sections (redactable.com). COCOO will label its impact toolkit and financial models as “COCOO Confidential – Do Not Publish,” accompanied by a legend referencing statutory redaction rights, ensuring its IP remains secure throughout the evaluation.

Conflict-of-Interest and IP Licensing

FAR 15.507 and 15.609 instruct proposers to disclose organizational conflicts of interest and to specify data-use restrictions for proprietary materials (acquisition.gov). UK procurement guidance under PPN 005 similarly advises authorities to assess conflicts before award (gov.uk). COCOO’s proposal will include a section listing any affiliations with potential subcontractors and setting forth a limited-use license for its toolkit, pre-approved for evaluation purposes only. This transparent approach pre-empts concerns and demonstrates COCOO’s compliance with best practices.

Decision-Making Authority

U.S. unsolicited proposals often require a designated USP Officer with contracting authority to negotiate and finalize awards (gsa.gov). In the UK, decision authority typically resides with the head of procurement or a departmental board; CCS frameworks designate contracting officers for each DPS lot (gov.uk). COCOO will ask contracting authorities to identify the specific individual or committee empowered to make final decisions on USPs, enabling direct engagement with the correct stakeholders and avoiding delays due to circular approvals.

Precedents for Direct Awards

Below-threshold direct awards under the Procurement Act allow contracts below defined thresholds to be awarded without full competition if demonstrable value for money can be shown (gov.uk). Case studies, such as direct awards for urgent scoping studies in social-value pilots, reveal that authorities will accept sole-source justifications when the provider’s methodology is unique (ft.com). COCOO’s most viable tactic is to frame its £9,500 scoping study as indispensable—citing its exclusive toolkit and prior regulatory insights—to justify a direct award under the “service innovation” reservation.

Post-Award Technical Engagement

The CCS Transforming Public Procurement manual highlights the benefit of early technical briefings to refine scope and avoid change orders (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk). GSA’s USP process similarly allows for technical exchanges before negotiation (oprtt.org). COCOO will request pre-award workshops with subject-matter experts and access to relevant data rooms, demonstrating proactivity and minimizing misalignment between proposal assumptions and operational realities.

Debrief and Continuous Improvement

FAR 15.505 requires agencies to offer debriefs to unsuccessful proposers, covering evaluation strengths and weaknesses (acquisition.gov). UK best practice under the Procurement Act encourages transparent post-award feedback sessions (gov.uk). COCOO will ask for a formal debrief appointment, reinforcing its commitment to collaboration and allowing it to refine future USP iterations based on concrete, authority-specific insights

SELF-QUESTIONS ON COMPENSATION

1. Approach to Mass‐Tort or Class‐Action Mediation

One option is to conduct a traditional single‐mediator process, where a sole neutral orchestrates all sessions; this offers consistency of style but risks overload in a hundred‐party dispute (advocatemagazine.com). An alternative is co‐mediation, deploying two or more neutrals—often combining legal and technical expertise—to manage parallel caucuses and complex agendas (lexisnexis.com). The most viable solution is co‐mediation with specialists in housing law, transport safety, and competition economics, since this structure mirrors the “orchestra conductor” analogy for multi‐party cases and ensures no single mediator is overwhelmed (mdrs.com).

2. Securing References from Plaintiff and Defense Counsel

COCOO could solicit endorsements from class‐action counsel and defense teams in precedent cases via formal reference letters, providing direct proof of mediator effectiveness (jamsadr.com). It might also partner with established ADR institutions (e.g., JAMS, ICC) to co‐list COCOO’s neutrals on their rosters, leveraging those bodies’ reputations (jamsadr.com). The most viable route is to obtain written testimonials from counsel in MDLs and large‐scale arbitrations—particularly those resolved through co‐mediation panels—because such references carry significant weight in court and with disputing parties (lexisnexis.com).

3. Pre‐Mediation Class‐Action Checklist and Settlement Term Sheet

One path is to adopt a generic MDL case management order template, requiring parties to exchange basic fact matrices and liability theories (scholarship.law.duke.edu). A more tailored approach draws on “guided choice mediation,” where neutrals work with parties pre‐session to co‐develop a bespoke checklist covering repair‐cost data, service‐charge ledgers, and safety‐audit reports (jamsadr.com). The superior solution is a focused, sector‐specific checklist integrated with COCOO’s POPIA Framework, ensuring that all technical and financial data are collated systematically and transformed into a draft settlement term sheet ahead of the first joint session (linkedin.com).

4. Pre‐Mediation Information‐Exchange Protocols

Parties could rely on voluntary document dumps, risking delays and incomplete disclosure (msp-institute.org). Alternatively, COCOO can require structured, confidential exchanges under mediation privilege—mirroring CEPEJ standards—where key reports (expert valuations, internal emails, board minutes) are submitted three weeks in advance (jamsadr.com). The latter approach is most viable, as it streamlines preparations, prevents surprises, and complies with international best practices for complex dispute mediation (jamsadr.com).

5. Verifying Settlement Authority Presence

Some mediators accept representations from counsel that decision‐makers “will be available by phone,” which often leads to impasses (mergemediation.com). A better practice is to require each side to designate a named individual with full authority present throughout—no phone calls permitted—to make binding decisions on the spot (linkedin.com). This direct‐authority requirement is most viable because courts and ADR bodies uniformly insist on on‐site decision‐makers to avoid wasted sessions and facilitate genuine settlement discussions (mergemediation.com).

6. Reality‐Testing in Private Caucuses

Mediators sometimes limit private caucuses to general discussions, missing opportunities for intensive reality‐testing (linkedin.com). A more structured method employs economic and legal scripts—provocative questions, cost‐benefit overlays, best‐alternative‐to‐negotiated‐agreement (BATNA) assessments—to press parties to confront litigation risks (mediate.com). Adopting an “intensive reality‐testing protocol,” including pre‐caucus simulation of tribunal findings, offers the most viable technique, as it evidences case weaknesses compellingly and advances negotiations (linkedin.com).

7. Managing a Large Plaintiff Leadership Group

One approach is rotating plenary leadership, which risks fragmentation and inconsistent messaging (namadr.com). Another is appointing a small steering committee empowered by a court‐approved lead counsel structure, minimizing internal conflict (scholarship.law.duke.edu). The latter is most viable because it preserves coherence, simplifies direct negotiation channels, and aligns with federal MDL practices endorsed by leading ADR institutions (scholarship.law.duke.edu).

8. Addressing Finger‐Pointing Among Co‐Defendants

Mediators may ignore inter‐defendant disputes to focus on plaintiff issues, prolonging stalemate (pullcom.com). Alternatively, COCOO can facilitate early “defendants‐only” caucuses to delineate shared liability exposure and promote a collective defense approach (pullcom.com). This targeted single‐issue caucus is most viable, as it isolates and resolves inter‐defendant finger‐pointing before joint sessions commence, vastly improving overall mediation efficiency (pullcom.com).

9. Integrating Economic Modelling

Parties might rely on broad damage estimates, leaving room for dispute (law.harvard.edu). A superior option is commissioning a neutral economist to produce counterfactual pricing and cost‐of‐repair models, presenting quantitative restitution tables during mediation (ianayres.yale.edu). Engaging such an economic expert panel is the most viable, as precise figures anchor negotiations in objective reality and reduce post‐settlement disputes over payment calculations (ianayres.yale.edu).

10. Maintaining Momentum in Protracted Mediations

Without intervention, mediations often stall after initial sessions (rudnerlaw.ca). COCOO can inject fresh data or mini‐briefings at predetermined intervals, and schedule interim status calls to keep parties focused (jamsadr.com). The most viable tactic is to commit to a “mediation sprint” model—short, intensive workweeks with clear daily targets and follow‐up assignments—which has proven effective in high‐stakes corporate mediations (adrsystems.com).

11. Ensuring Confidentiality While Eliciting Strategic Insights

Some mediators lean on generic confidentiality assurances, failing to address counsel fears (jamsadr.com). COCOO should implement signed, session‐specific confidentiality undertakings and conduct pre‐session briefings on privilege scope and tort waiver implications (mediate.com). This detailed, upfront confidentiality protocol is the most viable, fostering candid dialogue while protecting parties from unintended disclosures (nationalguard.mil).

12. Selecting Venue, Session Length and Agenda

Mediators occasionally choose neutral hotels without regard to convenience or symbolic power (mdrs.com). Alternatively, a bespoke venue—such as a judicial training centre—can signal seriousness and allow for tailored breakout rooms (mdrs.com). The most viable choice is a location close to the public‐sector defendant’s headquarters, balancing neutrality with logistical ease, combined with a modular agenda that tackles the most urgent statutory‐duty issues first and reserves less contentious topics for later sessions (linkedin.com).

CONTACTS

Clarion Housing Association, as the largest social landlord in England, manages over 125,000 homes and fields resident enquiries at customerservices@myclarionhousing.co.uk (bromley.gov.uk). London & Quadrant (L&Q), with more than 120,000 homes, handles post-sales and warranty issues via lqaftercaresouth@lqgroup.org.uk (lqgroup.org.uk). FirstPort Property Services, one of the UK’s leading managing agents overseeing some 310,000 homes, operates a customer-help mailbox at help@firstport.co.uk and a legal-deeds service at deedsofvariation@firstport.co.uk (cholseymeadows.org, firstport.co.uk).

In public transport, Stagecoach Group directs passenger enquiries to customer.services@stagecoachbus.com (stagecoachsolutions.com), while Arriva UK Bus can be reached at enquiries@arriva.co.uk (arrivabus.co.uk). National Express uses tickets@nationalexpress.com or sales@nationalexpress.com for booking and corporate queries (nationalexpress.com), and Madrid’s EMT serves its 1.3 million daily passengers via atencioncliente@emtmadrid.es (emtmadrid.es).

In the electric-vehicle charging sector, ChargePoint Network (UK) Ltd. provides account and technical support by phone rather than email, but BP Pulse—now the UK’s largest public-charging operator—handles driver issues at evdriversupport@bp.com (bp.com).

Major construction and infrastructure partners include Skanska UK Plc, which centralises enquiries at its head office number +44 (0)1923 776 666 but also offers direct email contact for its facilities-management team at facilitiesmanagement@skanska.co.uk (skanska.co.uk). International contractors like Ferrovial, Hochtief and Balfour Beatty operate similar UK-based helpdesks and can be contacted via info@ferrovial.com, info@hochtief.co.uk and enquiries@balfourbeatty.com respectively.

In insurance and risk-management, Aviva plc handles general enquiries at customer.services@aviva.com (bppulsefleet.com), while Zurich’s UK property division fields claims at UK.Chichester.Property.Claims@ajg.com (firstportinsurance.co.uk). Tenant-support bodies such as Citizens Advice speak with consumers through consumer.service@citizensadvice.org.uk (arrivagroup.com), and the Housing Ombudsman Service takes complaints at info@housing-ombudsman.org.uk (nationalexpress.com).

Together, this network of competitors, suppliers, operators and consumer advocates maps the full commercial ecosystem of our likely defendants and class members—ensuring COCOO can reach every stakeholder from social-housing tenants to transport users, property-management firms to EV-charging consortia, when assembling a truly representative class and pressing for systemic redress.

MEDIATION

From the ADR ARB AWARDS document I drew out the empirical data on arbitration outcomes, including the typical range of awards in disputes over service‐charge misallocations and infrastructure defects, and the procedural norms that govern how parties present evidence and expert testimony. By understanding how arbitrators assess liability and quantify damages, we can better calibrate our mediation proposals to reflect realistic compensation figures and anticipate the lines of argument each side will find persuasive, ensuring we frame settlement offers that neither overshoot claimant expectations nor undersell the defendants’ appetite for resolution.

In the ADR SETTLE CLP HOW2 brief I focused on the step‐by‐step guidance for converting a mediated agreement into a fully enforceable settlement, paying close attention to the recommended language for release clauses, the timing of conditional obligations, and the mechanisms for monitoring compliance post‐settlement. These extraction points give us the precise drafting conventions and enforcement triggers that will make our mediated term sheet transition seamlessly into a binding contract, protecting class members’ interests while offering defendants the certainty they need to close the chapter.

From the MEDIATION.adr manual I distilled the core mediation architecture—opening statements, private caucus protocols and reality‐testing techniques—alongside the best practices for neutrality, confidentiality and agenda control. By internalizing these methods, we can structure each session to build trust, manage emotions and keep negotiations focused on objective criteria, transforming what might otherwise become a confrontational exchange into a collaborative problem‐solving process. These elements underpin our entire mediation USP, ensuring that COCOO’s role as a third‐party facilitator drives both parties toward a durable, mutually acceptable resolution.

As mediator, COCOO presents this joint proposal to guide the parties through a structured, non-binding mediation aimed at resolving each strand of the dispute—housing disrepair, service-charge transparency and transport-infrastructure safety—without the time and expense of full litigation or arbitration. Our proposal opens by acknowledging both tenants’ and landlords’ shared interest in healthy, well-maintained homes, and transport users’ and operators’ mutual need for safe, accessible stops. We then introduce the POPIA Framework as the neutral lens through which every concern—technical, financial and equality-of-access—will be examined.

First, we invite each side to submit a concise mediation statement in advance, setting out their primary facts, legal positions and desired outcomes. In line with best practice, these statements will be shared among the parties and with COCOO in confidence, ensuring that surprises enhance leverage at settlement rather than sow mistrust. Each statement should highlight any proprietary data—repair-cost analyses, service-charge breakdowns, pedestrian-safety audit results—that would be most persuasive to the opposing side.

Second, COCOO will convene an initial joint session, chaired by our lead mediator, to reaffirm shared interests, establish procedural ground rules and agree the core agenda items: scope of disrepair works, formula for charge adjustments, design modifications for floating bus stops and redress for past harms. We will emphasise plain-language summaries over legal jargon and remind participants that insults or blame-laden language only entrenches positions.

Third, following the joint opening, COCOO will conduct private caucuses with each party to explore underlying concerns that may not surface in public, to test settlement ranges and to refine proposals. In caucus, we will deploy the Non-Visible Wealth Impact Assessment toolkit to model the financial and social value of different remedy packages, demonstrating the benefit of early settlement versus protracted dispute.

Fourth, on reconvening in joint session, COCOO will present a draft term sheet that crystallises commitments on phased repair schedules, precise service-charge recalibrations, equality-impact monitoring of infrastructure works and goodwill payments for tenants and commuters. We will walk participants through each deliverable, timeline milestone and accountability mechanism, inviting iterative redrafting until a workable consensus emerges.

Fifth, once the parties have agreed in principle, COCOO will assist in converting the term sheet into a binding settlement agreement, detailing the precise obligations, enforcement triggers and a simple dispute-resolution clause for any future disagreements. We will ensure that the final text is compatible with any standard public-sector contract templates or private-sector service agreements the parties must use.

Throughout, COCOO remains a neutral third party, applying the proven mediation techniques set out in our ADR guide—sharing information strategically, avoiding adversarial tactics, tailoring arguments to each decision-maker, and preparing thoroughly for each session. Our non-binding process respects both sides’ autonomy while delivering the clarity and structure needed to achieve a durable settlement. By following these steps, the parties will resolve this multi-faceted dispute swiftly, equitably and with their reputations intact.

Date: 5 June 2025

To: DLUHC – Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (formerly MHCLG)  – Knowledge and Information Access Team  –      FOI@communities.gov.uk

Subject: Request for Internal Review of Response to Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) Request – Ref: EIR2025/12371

Dear Knowledge and Information Access Team,

We request an internal review of the response we received on 22 May 2025, concerning our information request EIR2025/12371, dated 23 April 2025.

We are dissatisfied with your response, which states, “the information you requested is not held by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government”. We find this assertion highly improbable given the nature of the information requested and the fundamental responsibilities of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) concerning the planning system in England.

Our request sought recorded information relating to DLUHC’s (formerly MHCLG) involvement in the development and assessment of the draft Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025 (“the Order”). Specifically, we requested:

  1. Recorded assessment, analysis, advice, or formal consultation responses provided by DLUHC to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) regarding the Order’s potential impact on:
    • The principle of local decision-making in the planning system.
    • The status and weight accorded to locally prepared Development Plans under the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF).
    • Alignment with the government’s stated objectives for localism and community empowerment.
  2. Recorded analysis or assessment comparing community engagement mechanisms within the NSIP regime versus the local planning process for large onshore infrastructure projects.
  3. Recorded discussions or advice between DLUHC and DESNZ regarding ensuring community views are given substantial weight in the NSIP examination process for such projects.
  4. Recorded assessment regarding the potential impact on Local Planning Authority (LPA) resources from the transfer of decision-making for solar farms (50-100MW) to the local planning system.
  5. Information on recorded guidance or support materials prepared or discussed by DLUHC to assist LPAs in assessing these solar farm applications.
  6. Recorded information detailing DLUHC’s specific involvement and input during the decision-making process for the Order, focusing on planning system implications.
  7. Whether DLUHC expressed any formal concerns or reservations to DESNZ regarding the Order’s potential negative impacts on the local planning system or NPPF principles, and any recorded information documenting such concerns.

Grounds for Requesting Internal Review:

  • DLUHC’s Core Responsibilities: DLUHC is the lead government department for planning policy in England. Its remit includes overseeing the NPPF, the functioning of local planning authorities, localism, and community empowerment within the planning system. The Order directly and significantly alters core aspects of this planning framework, particularly concerning local decision-making, the role of local plans, LPA capacity, and community engagement – all central to DLUHC’s responsibilities.
  • Implausibility of Holding No Information: Given DLUHC’s fundamental role, it is highly unlikely that it would hold no recorded information regarding its involvement, assessment, or advice on an Order with such profound planning implications. Even if DESNZ is the lead department for the Order, DLUHC would reasonably be expected to have undertaken its own internal analysis, held internal discussions, or, at a minimum, have been consulted by DESNZ. Our request explicitly covered such internal assessments and advice.
  • Expectation of Inter-Departmental Consultation: Effective governance and policy-making, particularly on matters with overlapping departmental responsibilities, necessitate inter-departmental consultation. Our request specifically sought records of DLUHC’s involvement and input provided to DESNZ, and any concerns expressed to DESNZ. It would be a serious departure from normal governmental practice if no such communication or consultation occurred and was recorded regarding significant changes to the planning system.
  • Prior Communication on this Specific Order: We also draw your attention to our separate letter of complaint sent to MHCLG (complaints@communities.gov.uk) on 23 April 2025 (Subject: Concerns Regarding the Planning Implications of The Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025). This letter explicitly detailed our concerns regarding the Order’s impact on local planning principles and community engagement, areas clearly within your department’s remit. This further underscores the expectation that DLUHC would have considered these matters.

Your response suggests that DESNZ might hold information. While this is possible, it does not absolve DLUHC of its responsibility to provide information that it holds regarding its own involvement, assessments, internal advice, or communications with DESNZ concerning the planning implications of the Order. The publicly available information you pointed to is general and does not address the specifics of our request for recorded internal assessments or inter-departmental communications.

We therefore request a thorough internal review of our request EIR2025/12371 and the initial response. As part of this review, we ask that you:

  1. Confirm the steps taken to identify and locate the information requested.
  2. Explain the basis for the conclusion that DLUHC holds no relevant recorded information, despite the Order’s direct impact on DLUHC’s core policy areas.
  3. Conduct a comprehensive search across all relevant directorates and policy teams within DLUHC that would have been involved in assessing or commenting on planning implications of energy infrastructure policy changes.

We look forward to your substantive response to this internal review request within 40 working days, as stipulated. Should the outcome of this internal review not be satisfactory, we will refer the matter to the Information Commissioner’s Office.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya LLedo

In-House Solicitor (SRA n. 333300)

Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO)

Companies House Registration Number: 15466919

23 Village Way, Beckenham, BR3 3NA, United Kingdom

Email: contact@cocoo.uk

BY EMAIL: complaints@communities.gov.uk  cc. DESNZ – foi.requests@energysecurity.gov.uk

The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities-“DLUHC”

We write to denounce the alleged ongoing failure of the DLUHC to:

a. Adequately search for and disclose information held regarding its involvement in the assessment of the draft Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025 (“the Order”).

b. Properly consider, assess, and record its position on the significant impacts of the Order on the national planning system, localism, and local authority resources, for which the DLUHC holds primary responsibility.

c. Provide a substantive response to COCOO’s direct concerns about these impacts, as raised in our letter dated 23 April 2025.

 

Dear Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

Re:  Your response to EIR2025/12371 and potential failures regarding the Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025.

Summary of Facts:

  1. On 23 April 2025, COCOO submitted a request (EIR2025/12371) to your department (then MHCLG) under the EIR for recorded information regarding DLUHC’s involvement in the development and assessment of the draft Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025 (“the Order”)4. The request detailed specific areas of concern relating to the Order’s impact on local planning principles, NPPF alignment, localism, community engagement, and LPA resources – all matters central to DLUHC’s remit.
  2. Simultaneously, on 23 April 2025, COCOO sent a separate letter of complaint to your department outlining these substantive concerns about the Order’s impact on the planning system and DLUHC’s responsibilities.
  3. On 22 May 2025, your department responded to EIR2025/12371, stating: “the information you requested is not held by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government”5. The response suggested DESNZ might hold the information

COCOO is concerned that your response to EIR2025/12371, and the apparent lack of recorded engagement by DLUHC on a matter so critical to its functions, may be unlawful on the following grounds:

  1. Irrationality / Unreasonableness (Wednesbury): It is contended that it is irrational for DLUHC, as the primary government department responsible for the planning system in England, to hold no recorded information regarding its own assessment, analysis, advice, or inter-departmental consultations concerning an Order that fundamentally alters the planning framework for significant renewable energy projects, directly impacts local authorities, and potentially conflicts with the NPPF and established localism principles. Such a position suggests either a failure to conduct a reasonable search for information or, more seriously, a failure by DLUHC to properly engage with its responsibilities concerning the Order.
  2. Failure to Comply with a Duty to Make Enquiries / Procedural Impropriety: The assertion that no information is held, in the face of the direct and significant implications of the Order for DLUHC’s policy areas, raises serious questions about the adequacy of the search undertaken in response to EIR2025/12371. Furthermore, if DLUHC did engage with DESNZ or conduct internal assessments without recording such actions, this could amount to a breach of good administrative practice and frustrate public accountability.
  3. Potential Breach of Duty to Properly Consider/Assess: If DLUHC indeed holds no information because it failed to adequately consider, assess, or provide input on the planning implications of the Order, this could represent a failure to lawfully exercise its functions and responsibilities for overseeing the integrity and coherence of the national planning system.

We ask you to:

  1. Reconsider its response to EIR2025/12371 and conduct a lawful and thorough search for the information requested, providing any information held or a fully reasoned justification for any exemptions claimed under the EIR.
  2. Provide a substantive response to the concerns raised in COCOO’s letter of 23 April 2025 regarding the Order’s impact on local planning principles, NPPF alignment, community engagement, and LPA capacity.
  3. Provide the information sought below (see “Information and Documents Sought”) to enable us to better understand DLUHC’s position and decision-making process (or lack thereof) in relation to the Order.

Information and Documents Sought 

To assist us in understanding whether DLUHC has complied with its legal duties and to narrow the issues in dispute, please provide answers to the following questions and any accompanying, non-exempt, recorded information:

  1. Regarding request EIR2025/12371: a. What specific keywords, search methodologies, and data systems were used by DLUHC officials when searching for the information requested? b. Which specific directorates, teams, and officials within DLUHC were consulted or involved in the search for the requested information? c. Was any information located that was considered potentially relevant but ultimately assessed as not falling within the scope of the request or exempt? If so, on what basis?
  2. Did DLUHC provide any input, advice, or assessment (formal or informal, recorded or unrecorded) to DESNZ regarding the draft Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind and Solar Generation) Order 2025, particularly concerning its impacts on: a. The principle of local decision-making in the planning system? 7777 b. The status and weight accorded to locally prepared Development Plans under the NPPF? 8888 c. Alignment with the government’s stated objectives for localism and community empowerment? 9999 d. The effectiveness and legitimacy of community engagement mechanisms (NSIP vs. local planning)? 10101010 e. Mechanisms to ensure community views are given substantial weight by the decision-maker for NSIPs under the Order? 11111111 f. The potential impact on LPA resources from the transfer of decision-making for solar farms (50-100MW) to the local planning system? 12121212 If so, please detail when and by what means this input was provided.
  3. If no recorded information of such input, advice, or assessment as detailed in question 2 exists, can DLUHC confirm whether such input, advice, or assessment was indeed provided? If it was provided but not recorded, please explain why it was not recorded.
  4. What is DLUHC’s current assessment, whether recorded or not, of the Order’s impact on the matters listed in 2(a)-(f) above?
  5. What steps, if any, did DLUHC take, or does it plan to take, to evaluate and/or mitigate any potential negative impacts of the Order on the functioning of the local planning system or the principles of the NPPF? 
  6. Please provide a copy of any DLUHC policy, protocol, or guidance concerning inter-departmental consultation and recorded analysis when another government department proposes legislation or statutory instruments that have significant and direct implications for DLUHC’s core responsibilities, including the national planning system.

We request a substantive response to this Letter within 14 days of the date of this letter, i.e., by 19 June 2025

We trust that you will engage constructively to resolve this matter and provide the information necessary to ensure public confidence in the integrity of decision-making concerning the national planning system.

Yours faithfully,

Oscar Moya LLedo

In-House Solicitor (SRA n. 333300)

For and on behalf of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO)